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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
PAUL SUGAR and HARRY ULMER, 
d/b/a SUGAR & UiLMER, a copart-
nership, 
Appellants, 
- vs.-
HARRY B. MILLER, 
Respondent. 
Case 
No. 8'639 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Throughout this brief ·the parties will be referred to as 
they appear in the action below. D·efendant (Respondent) dis-
agrees with the statement of facts as appears in the Plaintiffs=-
(Appellants') brief. 
The: defendant is the owner and operator of the Lorraine 
Press, a printing establishment, and the plaintiffs are the 
general partners of an accounting firm. At ~the latter part 
of the Utah "uranium boom," around 1955, the plaintiffs or-
ganized a company called the Deseret Uranium Company 
(R. 10) and contacted the defendant to obtain his services to 
print the prospectus for the company. Having had bad ex-
perience with uranium· companies, the defendant refused to 
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2 
extend credit to the company and accepted ·the printing order 
only after the plaintiffs had personally assumed the payment. 
(R. 14, 15, 16, 18). The bill for tthe printing came to $2,468.80 
(Exhibit No. 3). 
In January, 1956, after repeated demands for payment, 
the plaintiffs and the defendant obtained a loan from a bank 
for $2,000, and the plaintiff signed with the ,defendant as co-
makers. (R. 3) The money from the loan was given to the 
defendant as partial payment of the bill with the understand-
ing that the plaintiffs would be reimbursed from the uranium 
company underwriting proceeds (R. 28). 
The plaintiffs brought rthis action to recover the $2,000 
which they had paid back to the bank. They alleged that 
they had only guaranteed the note. Defendant counter-claimed 
and alleged as a set-of£ that the plaintiffs owed him the 
$2,468.80 for the printing, and that therefore the defendant 
was entitled to a judgment of $468.80 on the counter-claim. 
At the trial the defendant ~stipulated as to the amount 
claim·ed on the note, and it was agreed that the only issue 
in the case concerned the set-off (R. 8, 9). It is upon the mal 
court's findings fur the defendant that this appeal is taken. 
STATE:MENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT O·NE: DEFENDANT STIPULATED THAT HE 
RECEIVED THE $2,000 AS ALLEGED IN THE COM· 
PLAINT. HE DID NOT STI·PULATE AS TO INTEREST 
AND ATTORNEYS' FEES. 
POINT fWO: THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT 
ARE AMPLY SUPPO·RTED BY EVIDENCE, AND THE 
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COURTS c:o·NCLUSlONS OF LA:W NEC.ESSARILY 
AND CO·RRE·CTLY CORRESPOND WITH THE FIND-
INGS OF FACT. 
POINT THREE: THE COURT'S FINDINGS O:F FACf 
TIIAT THE PLAIN'TIF·FS AGREE.D TO PAY THE DE-
FENDANT IS NOT BARRE.D B·Y THE STATUTE O·F 
FRAU~os. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT O·NE. 
DEFEN·DANT STIPULATED THAT HE RE~CEIVED· 
THE ·$2,000 AS ALLEGE·D IN THE CO~MPLAINT. HE 
DID NOT STIPULATE. AS TO INTEREST AND AT-
TORNE.YS~ FEES. 
The only issue involVred in this case is whether or not 
the ~defendant has a set-off against tthe plaintiffs. The amount of 
money involved in both the complaint and the counter-claim 
was not in question, and at the beginning of the trial, counsel 
for the defendant stipulated ~that $·2,000 was received by the 
defendant (R. 8, H) and ·at the same time pointed out that the 
amount claimed to be owed by the plainrtiffs was not in ques-
tion (R. 8). Plaintiffs have never questioned the correctness 
of this amount as shown on EXhibit No. 3. 
To expedite the trial, the defendant stipulated to 'the 
amount in controversy ·as claimed in the complaint (R. 9). 'That 
he did not intend to stipulate as .to inJterest and attorneys~ fees 
is apparent. In his answer the defendant denied ~that the plain-
tiffs were entitled to attorneys~ fees (R. 4); in fact, t~he note in 
question was not such as to allow sudh £el,"{'1f it was not 
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between the defendant and the plaintiffs since they were co-
makers, and (2) there was no contractual relationship between 
them awa~ding attorneys' .fees (R. 3). In addition, the ·defendant 
had counter-claimed for $468.80, whereas if he had stipulated 
to the entire amount claimed in the complainrt, it would have 
exceeded the amount of the counterclaim, and there would 
have been nothing to litigate. See 41 A.L.R. 2d 677 and 
cas·es cited therein where the majority rule is stated that 
where an offset exceeds the amount owed, no attorneys;, fees 
will be awarded. 
The court cor1:ectly found no cause of action on the com-
plaint. Since the amount of the plaintiffs' ·claim was stipulated 
to be $2,000.00 and the court found that the plaintiffs owed 
the defendant ·$2,468.80 (R. 61), the court was oorreot in its 
ruling. This matter was specifically argued after the trial 
and before the signing of the findings of fact and conclusions 
by the court. A·fter careful review of the plaintiffs' position, 
the court ruled in favor of the defendant. 
POINT TWO 
THE COURT'S FINDIN'GS OF FACT ARE AMPLY 
SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE, AND THE COURT'S 
CO·N·CLUSIONS OF LAW NECESSARILY AND COR-
RECTLY CO·RRESPOND WITH THE FINDINGS OF 
FACT. 
The plaintiff·s criticize the form of the court's findings. 
Whether or not the plaintiffs agreed to pay the defendant 
is a finding of fact which the court arrived at after hearing 
the evidence. Based upon this finding, the court concluded in 
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its Conclusions of L~aw that 1the defendant was entitled to a 
judgment. As long as the evidence ·supports the findings, 
which outside of the evidentiary objection the plaintiffs do 
not question, the court was correct in basing its conclusions 
upon such findings. 
POINT THREE 
THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT THAT THE 
PLAINTIFFS AGREED TO PAY THE DEFEND·ANT 
IS NOT BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
Plaintiffs allege that thE- statements made by the plaintiffs 
constituting on agreement are barred by rthe following section 
of the Statute of Frauds. Title 25-5-4, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended: 
"'In the following cases every agreement shall be void 
unless ·such agreement or some note or memorandum 
thereof is in writing subscribed by the party to be 
charged therewith: . 
"(2) Every promise to answer for the debt, default or 
miscarriage of another." 
The problem of whether a promise by a stockholder, offi-
cer, or director to pay a debt of a corporation is subject to 
the starute of Frauds is well annotated in 35 A.L.R. 2d 906. 
From this annotation the following general rules are taken: 
The problem usually resolves itself into a determination 
of whether the promise was original or collateral. The impor-
tant question is how can a particular promise be determined 
to be either original or collateral. There are various tests 
which different courts use, although there is no universal 
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test used by all coum:s is all ·circumstances. (Ibid. P. 908). The 
following tests are then enumerated: 
1. . "If the main purpose and object in making the 
promise is not to answer for another, but to suhserve 
the promisor's interest, and the consideration is bene-
ficial to him, the promise is. original and not within 
the statute." (Ibid. P. 909). 
In this case the plaintiffs stated that they had a material 
interest in the uranium company (R. 11). They picked the 
officers (R. 11, 12). The plaintiffs stated that rthey were to re-
ceive a cash payment from the company if the public offering 
was a ·success (R. 11), and the printing of a prospectus is, of 
course, necessary for a pubhc offering. Inasmuch as the plain-
tiffs were to receive substantial compensation in the form of 
cash, royalties, and stock f.or their services, they stood to benefit 
beyond the usual benefits that enure to a ~stockholder. Aside 
from this, 'Where the promisor owns a majority of the stock, 
the courts s·eem ·more inclined to find that rthe benefits to 
him is sufficient to take the promise out of the statute" (Ibid. 
P. 910). 
2. "The determination of whether such a promise is 
original or collateral depends upon whether such a 
promise is original ·to the promisor, or whether the 
indebtedness is also primarily that of the third person. 
In the latter case i1t is within the statute, while in the 
former it may not be." (Ibid. P. 909). 
The defendant did not intend to extend any credit to the 
uranium company. He had had unfavorable experience in 
relying on such companies for payment, and in fact he would 
not take the order for the printing unless the plaintiff.s assumed 
the obligation (R. 14-16). The defendant emphatically informed 
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the plaintiffs that he could not speculate on a uranium company 
(R. 19). The defendant 'had printed :85 .to 90 per cent of the 
prospectuses :f.or such companies (R. 20) and knew that he 
could nat rely on their ability to s·eM stock. The company, 
in fact, was never able ~to sell its stock. In this case the credit 
was extended solely to the plaintif:f.s which the obligation 
primary theirs and thus outsi·de the Statute of Frauds. 
Appellants allege that the fact that goods are charged on 
the books of a merchant to the pe~son for whose use they were 
furnished is prima facie evidence, aJt least that they were sold 
on his credit. A search of the cases reveals that the law is not 
that certain. Quoting from 35 A.L.R. 2d at P. 936 wherein 
this precise subJect is annotated: 
"Such charge (on the merchant's books) is evidence, no 
doubt, of an intent on the part of the crediltor to look 
to the corporation :For payment, and the language used 
in some of the opinions would indicate that such a 
·charge is regarded as conclusive against the crediror. 
It is fair to assume, however, that the court had in mind 
the facts o£ the partioular case, and was merely refer-
ring to the effeot of the charge to the corporation as an 
evidentiary fact in view of the circumstances, without 
any intention of asserting a rule of law.n 
The trial court considered this evidence wit!h all o£ the other 
evidence in the case and found in favor of thedefendant. 
There is substantial competent evidence to support the 
following facts: 
1. The plainltiffslJ promise was original and not collateral. 
2. The obj-ect of the plaintiffs' promise was to subserve 
or promote a personal interest of their own. 
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3. The benefit the plaintiffs were to derive was more 
than the indirect benefit which would accrue Ito them 
as stockholders in the uranium ··company. 
4. The credit was given to the plaintiffs and not to. the 
corporation. 
5. Plaintiffs~ promise was made to induce the defendant 
to print the prospectuses after he had refused to per-
form on behalf of the corporation only. 
Any one or all of these mentioned facts regarding this case 
are sufficient to rtake the plaintiffs' promise out of the Statute 
of Frauds. 
The following additional citations are given to support the 
above propositions: 49 Am. ]ur. pp. 417, 418; 37 C.].S. pp. 523, 
530, 531; Moon v. Greenlee, et al., Colorado, 1920; 195 p. 1100 
Parish v. Greco, California_, 1953, 258 P. 2d 566; Suverkrup et al. 
v. Suhl, California, 1951, 238 P. 2d 67 4; Eilertsen v. Weber, et 
al., Oregon, 1953, 255 P. 2d 150; Gutowsky v. Halliburton Oil 
Well Co., Oklahoma, 1955, 287 P. 2d 204; Fairview Lumber Co. 
v. Makos, Washington, 1954, 265 P. 2d 837. 
CONCLUSION 
In the United States Supreme Comt case of Davis v. 
Patrick, 141 U.S. 479, 35 L. Ed. 826, 12 S. Ct. 58, the purpose 
of thi~ provisions of the Statute of Frauds was discussed. Its 
purposes, as· there set f.o1~th, were to place the duty of paying a 
debt on the person receiving the benefit since there is a tendancy 
of a pflon1isee, when the real debtor is unable to pay, to enlarge 
the dEbt or the responsibilH): by torturing mere words of en-
couragcn1ent and confidence into an absolute promise. The court 
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said, " . . . it is so obviously just that a promisor receiving no 
benefits should be bound only by the exact terms of his promise, 
that this statute requiring a. memorandum in writing was en-
acted.'' The court went on to say, "But cases sometimes arise 
in whidh, though a third party is the original obligor, the pri-
m·ary debtor, the promisor has a personal, immediate and pe-
cuniary interest in the transaction, and is .therefore himself a 
party to be benefited by the performance of the promisee. In 
such cases the r-eason which underlies and which prompted this 
statutory provision fails, and the courts will give effect to the 
promise." See also 35 A.L.R. 2d. 912, 913, wherein rth.is case is 
cited. 
The trial of this case invo1ved one issue, namely, did the 
plaintiffs personally agree to pay the bill; or, stated differently, 
was the printing done for them individually. Tiris raised pri-
marilv a factual issue and the court found that issue in favor 
of the defendant. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable 
to the defendant, it is manifest there is sufficient competent evi-
dence not only to sustain the finding of the trial court, but 
rather it compels such a determination. The agreement in ques-
tion and the circumstances therewith fall ~squarely within the 
policy that is outside the purpos·es of the Statute of Frauds. 
There£ore, ·evidence as to the agreement was correctly admit-
ted, and the decision of the trial court should be affirmed. 
RespectfuBy submitted, 
RALPH & B-USHNE·LL, 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Respond'elllt 
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